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to  get  access  to  the Black Sea.  In  1686 the French ambassador, Pierre de 
Girardin, was told by aPorte official that the sultan would rather open the 
gates  of his harem  than  let  strangers  a free  passage  to  the Black Sea1• A 
similar  metaphor  was  used  in  1700  by  the  chief dragoman,  Alexander 
Mavrocordatos,  in his  discourse with a Russian envoy, Dimitrij  Golicyn. 
Denying the Russian claim to  the right of free  navigation, Mavrocordatos 
compared  the  Black  Sea  to  a  chaste  and  pure  virgin,  whose  virginity 
would be violated by foreign vessels2• 
While  sexual  connotations  with  harem s  and  virgins  seemed  to 
dominate  the  seventeenth  century  imagination,  twentieth  century historians 
had  a  special  liking  for  a  geographic  ­ and  nationalistic  ­ term:  the 
"Turkish  lake"  [Tiirk galii]. According  to  Paul Cemovodeanu,  the Black 
Sea  became  a  "Turkish  lake"  for  almost  three  centuries,  between  the 
conquest  of Caffa  in  1475  and  the  treaty  of Kli9iik  Kaynarca  of 17743. 
Yet,  it was Halil  Ina1clk whose powerful picture of an  "Ottoman economic 
mind"  mostly  influenced  a  few  generations  of historians.  In his  eyes, 
Mehmed  the  Conqueror  was  a  pro\o­mercantilist  and  proto­absolutist 
ruler, whose  conscious policy converted  the Black Sea into  the Ottoman 
reserve.  Ina1clk  rejected  the  stereotype  of  "Turkish  hostility  towards 
• A preliminary  version  of this  article  was  read  at  the  17th  symposium of the  CIEPO  
(Trabzon, 18­23 September 2006).  
l Robert Mantran, Istanbul dans la seconde moitie du XVIr siec/e, Paris,  1962, p.  575.  
2 Paul Cemovodeanu, "England and the question of free trade in the Black Sea in the  17th  
century", RRH,  6,  1967, p.  15­22, esp. p.  21, n.  26.  
3  Ibid., p. 16.  .  
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trade,"  coined by his  predecessors Wilhelm Heyd  and Marian  ｍ｡łｯｷｩｳｴＮ＠
He  stressed  the  Ottoman  efforts  to  provide  safe  conditions  for  the 
international  trade  and  for  the  provisioning of Constantinople.  The only 
notable difference after the Ottoman conquest was that ­ to  quote Inalclk 
­­ the Ottomans "put an end, in favor of the indigenous populations, to  the 
economic  and  political  dominance  of the  Italian  maritime  states,  which 
exploited and diverted the wealth ofthe region as  alien colonial powers,,4. 
Ina1clk  did  not  deny  that  the  Ottomans  aimed  to  remove  foreign 
merchants  from  the  Black  Sea,  but  he  also  stressed  the  Ottoman 
pragmatism  that  delayed  the  final  closure of the  region.  Various  authors, 
including  MaUli.ce  Aymard,  Mihnea  Berindei,  Gilles  Veinstein,  and 
Christiane Villain­Gandossi proved beyond doubt  the  presence of Italian 
merchants in the Black Sea at least until mid­sixteenth centuri. 
According  to  Inalclk,  it  was  not  with  the  conquest  of Caffa  of 
1475, not even the conquest ofKili and Akkerman in 1484, but only with 
the  conquest of Budjak in  1538  that the dream  of an  "Ottoman lake" was 
finalized6.  Yet,  there  were  sections  of the  Black  Sea  shore  where  the 
Ottoman  sovereignty was  sti11  questioned  for  another  century.  Since  the 
late  fourteenth  century  the  Black  Sea  shore  betweeJ;l  the  mouth  of 
Dniester  [Turla]  and  the mouth of Dnieper [Ozu]  belonged to  Lithuania. 
The  Lithuanian  grand  duke,  Vytautas,  fortified  his  new  frontier  by 
founding  strongholds  in  ｔ｡ｷ｡ńＬ＠ Oczaków,  ｈ｡､żｩ｢･ｪ＠ and MajakC.  In the 
late fifteenth  century the eastern and southern frontiers  of Lithuania were 
endangered  by  the  consolidating  powers  of Muscovy  and  Crimea.  The 
Crimean khan Mengli Giray occupied the Lithuanian Black Sea shore and 
4  Halil  Inalctk,  Sourees  and studies  on  the  Ottoman  Blaek  Sea,  vol.  1:  The  eustoms  
register  ofCajJa,  1487­1490,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  1996,  p.  110­111;  ef  aIso  Id.,  "The  
question ofthe closing ofthe Black Sea under the Ottomans", APXE:IOV Jlovrov 35,1979,  
p.74­110.  ,  
5 Maurice Aymard,  Venice,  Raguse et le commerce du  bM pendant la  seconde moitie du  
XV1e  siecle, Paris,  1966, p.  46; Mihnea Berindei and Gilles Veinstein,  "La Tana­Azaq de  
la pn!sence  italienne a l'emprise ottomane (fin Xme­milieu XVI"  siecle)",  Turciea.  8/2,  
1976,  p.  110­201,  esp.  p.  149  and  152;  Christiane  Villain­Gandossi,  "Contribution  a  
l'etude des relations diplomatiques et commerciales entre Venise et la Porte ottomane au  
XVI" siecle", SF,  26,  1967, p.  22­45, esp. p.  32­35  and 40; continued in SF, 28,  1969, p.  








fortress  was  garrisoned  by  Ottoman  troops.  In  the  future  decades  this 
fortress ­ known to the Ottomans as Ozu kalesi ­ would become the center 
of a sandjak, and later of an eyalet. 
Yet,  the  rulers  of Lithuania,  being  simultaneously  the  kings  of 
Poland,  did not easily recognize  the  loss  of the Black Sea shore. In May 
1538,  shortly  before  the  Ottoman  campaign  in  Moldavia which  was  to 
result  in the conquest ofBudjak, the Polish king Sigismund instructed his 
envoy to  the Porte, Erazm Kretkowski,  to  address  the  sultan is  his name: 
"Allatum  est  etiam  ad  Regiam  Maiestatem  quod  Caesarea  Celsitudo 
Vestra arcem Oczakow, et alias nonnullas arces, quae ad Regnum Maiestatis 
Regiae,  a nullo  retroacto  tempore  pertinent,  praesidiis  firmaverit  et  illas 
extruere  decreverit.  Maiestas  Regia  rogat  ut  Caesarea  Celsitudo  Vestra, 
pro animi  sui magnitudine, non pluris  facere,  arcem Oczakow, velit quod 
suam, in servandis foederibus usque adeo laudatam constantiam,,9. 
An indirect  response  to  these  c1aims  is  contained  in  a  letter  by  . 
Sultan Stileyman to King Sigismund, dated four years  later,  in November 
1542. The sultan, informed by his border commanders that the territory in 
question had belonged to  the Crimean khan  for  at  least 30­40 years  (otuz 
klrk ylldan  ziyade  Tatar  hanlarz  zabt  idab),  expressed  his  astonishment 
with su ch delayed and stubbom reaction of his  royal partner IO • The failed 
8  On  Cankerman  and  its  founding,  see  V.  Syroeckovskij,  "Puti  i  uslovija  snosem] 
Moskvy s Krymom na rubeze XVI veka",  JAN SSSR,  7 series:  Otdelenie  ｯ｢ｓć･ｳｴｶ･ｮｮｹｸ＠
nauk, 1932, p.  194­237, esp.  p.  219­221 ; Zygmunt Abrahamowicz (ed.),  ｋｳｩęｧ｡＠ ｰｯ､ｲ￳ ż ｹ＠
Ewl(ji Czelebiego (wybór), Warsaw,  1969, p.  378, n.  1;  Id., "Stara turecka mapa Ukrainy 
z planem wysadzenia  ､ｮｩ･ｰｲｺ｡ńｳｫｩ｣ｨ＠ porohów i ataku  floty  tureckiej  na Kijów", Studia 
Historyczne,  44, 2001, p.  3­23, esp. p.  18. 
9 Warsaw, Archiwum  ｇł￳ｷｮ･＠ Akt Dawnych [hereafter, AGAD), Libri Legationum, sign. 
6,  fol.  33v;  the  same  fragment,  preserved  in  the  ｏｰ｡ｬｩńｳｫｩＧｳ＠ manuscript  of Acta 
Tomiciana,  is published in lancu Bidian, "Moldova in tratativele polono­otomane intr­un 
document  din  anul  1538", SM/M,  7,  1974,  p.  309­319,  esp.  p.  312.  The most  detailed 
treatment ofthe Lithuanian­Ottoman border conf1ict of 1538­1544 is by Gilles Veinstein, 
"L'occupation  ottomane  ､Ｇｏć｡ｫｯｶ＠ et  le  probleme  de  la  frontiere  lituano­tatare  1538-
1544"  in: Ch. Lemercier­Quelquejay, G. Veinstein, S.  E. Wimbusch (eds.), Pass e Turco-
Tatar, present sovietique. Etudes  offertes  ｩł＠ Alexandre  Bennigsen, Louvain­Paris,  1986, 
p. 123­155; Kretkowski ' s embassy is mentioned on p.  131.  
10 AGAD, Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie  [hereafter, AKW),  ､ｺｩ｡ł＠ turecki, karton 68,  
teczka 78,  no. 165;  for  a Polish summary,  see Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, Katalog dokumentów  
tureckich.  Dokumenty  do  dziejów  Polski  i krajów  ｯ ś｣ｩ･ｮ ｮｹ｣ ｨ＠ w latach  1455­1672,  
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demarcation  of 1538­1544  between  Poland­Lithuania  and  the  Ottoman 
Empire was  already studied by Gilles Veinstein,  who  based his  research 
on  the  preserved  correspondence  between  the  king  and  the  ｳｵłｴ｡ｮ II. In 
1542  commissioners  were  appointed  from  both  sides,  but  they  failed  to 
meet  till  the  end  of that  year.  While  the  Poles  officially  demanded  the 
acknowledgment  of the  Black  Sea border,  they proposed  to  me et  at  the 
river  Kodyma,  the  right  tributary  of the  Boh  [Aksu].  Osman  Beg,  the 
Ottoman  commissioner,  requested  that  the  initial  meeting  should  take 
place on the  river  ｓ｡ｷｲ｡ńＬ＠ since  the  future  border  should be  demarcated 
further north.  Finally, he  agreed for a meeting on the Kodyma, but it was 
too  late  for  the  Poles.  After  another  year  of correspondence,  mutual 
explanations and accusations,  in 1544 King Sigismund notified the  ｳｵłｴ｡ｮ＠
that  his  commissioners  were  ready  to  resume  the  task.  Siileyman 
answered  that  he would  love  to,  but  he was  too  busy with hunting near 
Bursa so the matter had to be postponed. 
What  strikes  one  is  that  both  sides  treated  the  disputed border as 
an Ottoman­Polish one though formally the border palatinates of Kiev and 
Braclav still belonged to  Lithuania and only in 1569 they were incorporated 
to  Poland.  Border  commissioners  and  envoys  to  the  Porte  were  mostly 
recruited from among Polish, and not Lithuanian nobles. All these  factors 
disclose  the  fact  that  already in  the  1540s  the  southem policy of Poland-




Warsaw,  1959,  p.  77­79.  A  Polish  contemporary  translation  (wrongly  dated  1540)  is  
published  in  Zygmunt  Bartoszewicz  (ed.),  "Z  ｲęｫｯｰｩｳｭ￳ｷ＠ Dogiela  (tomu  II  ｣ｺęś｣ｩ＠ I)  
ｷｹｪąｴｫｩ＠ ś｣ｩąｧ｡ｪą｣･＠ ｳｩę＠ do  ､ｺｩ｡ł｡ń＠ ｭｩę､ｺｹ＠ królami  Zygmuntem  I  i  Zygmuntem  II,  a  
Solimanem  ｳｵłｴ｡ｮ･ｭ＠ tureckim", Dziennik  ｗｩｬ･ńｳｫｩＯｈｩｳｴｯｲｩ｡＠ i literatura,  vol.  1,  182), p.  
228­232.  
II Veinstein,  "L'occupationottomane  ､Ｇｏć｡ｫｯｶＢ Ｎ＠  
12 "Zikr  olU/wn  smur  ir;inde  ehl­i  islamdan  nir;e  kimesnenin  makbereleri  ve  nir;e 
mescidler  ve  medreseler  'alametleri  dahi  bulunlllu$,"  see  AGAD, AKW,  ､ｺｩ｡ł＠ turecki, 
karton 68,  teczka 78,  no.  165  (cf.  n.  10). In  1540 the Polish envoy,  Jakub Wilamowski, 
notified the king of his disputes at the Porte:  "daleko  ｳｩę＠ w pola  ｷｰｩ･ｲ｡ｪą＠ [.. . ]  ｡ｬｬ･ｧｵｪą｣＠ ｩż＠
tam  ｳą＠ groby tatarskie murowane z pismem";  see AGAD, Libri Legationum, sign. 9,  fol. 
49v­54v;  this  last  fragment  is  pub1ished  in  Ilie  Corfus  (ed.), Documente  privitoare  la 
istoria Romaniei culese din  arhivele polone.  Secolul al XVI­lea. Bucharest,  1979, p.  31. 
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Amazingly,  the ultimate  failure of the demarcation did not  lead to 
a  war.  For  almost  another  century,  Polish­Ottoman  relations  remained 
largely peaceful,  at  times  even  friendly.  A major war broke  out  only  in 
1620,  and  the  first  real  demarcation was  happily concluded  in  1633.  By 
that  time,  however,  the  Polish­Lithuanian  side  could  ­ at  1east de  iure  -
support  its  claim  to  the  Black  Sea  shore.  Michalon  Lituanus,  the 
renaissance writer identified today as  ｗ･ｮ｣ł｡ｷ＠ ｍｩｫ ｯ ł｡ｪ･ｷｩ｣ｺＬ＠ was sent in 
Lithuanian  embassy  to  the  Crimea  in  1542.  In  his  treaty De  moribus 
ｔ｡ｲｴ｡ｲｯｮłｭＬ＠ composed  by  1550,  he  described  the  limits  of Lithuania 
reaching  "ad pontum Euxinum ubi  ostia Borysthenis,  et  [ ... ]  ad  terminos 
Tauricae,  ac  Towani  traiectu Borysthenis" 13.  Piotr Zborowski,  the Polish 
envoy  to  the  Porte  in  1568,  suggested  the  Polish  king  that  one  should 
make use ofthe c1ause ofthe Ottoman­Polish capitulations, providing that 
Tatar and Turkish herdsmen should pay pasture taxes for using pasturages 
within  the  royal  domain.  According  to  Zborowski,  all  pasturages  on  the 
left  shore  of the Dniester should have been regarded  as  belonging to  the 
king l4 . 
As  late  as  1605,  Florian  Oleszko,  a Polish envoy  to  the  Crimean 
khan,  was  instructed  to  demand  the  acknowledgement  of Polish borders 
reaching  the  Black  Sea l5 .  Subsequent  Polish  envoys  to  Bahyesaray 
repeated this request in 1610,  1620, and even after the Hotin campaign, in 
1622 16. Yet,  apparent1y this dem and was not treated seriously.  First1y,  the 
Poles knew well that the khan could not cede territories controlled jointly 
by  him  and  the  Ottoman  garrisons  without  the  consent  of  the  sultan. 
Secondly,  the Polish envoys demanded simultaneously that the Tatars  do 
not  cross  the  Polish  territory  while  heading  for  campaigns.  Since  the 
khans were often summoned to  join the Ottoman campaigns  in Hungary, 
one  could  not  expect  that  they  do  not  cross  the  Polish  territory,  if it 
13  Michalonis  Utuani  de  moribus  Tartarorum,  Lituanorum  et Moschorum fragmina  X;  
multiplici  historia  rejerta,  BasIe,  1615,  p.  24;  on  the  author,  see  Jerzy  ｏ ｣ ｨｭ｡ńｳｫｩＬ＠  
"Michalon  Litwin  i  jego  traktat  o  zwyczajach  Tatarów,  Litwinów  i  Moskwicinów  z  
ｰｯłｯｷｹ＠ XVI wieku", Kwartalnik Histo ryczny, 83, 1976, p. 765­783, esp. p.  772.  
14 Piotr Zborowski,  "Relacya poselstwa pana wojnickiego królowi  [ ... ]"  in JózefIgnacy  
Kraszewski (ed.),  ｐｯ､ｲ￳ ż･＠ i poselstwa polskie do  Turcji,  Cracow,  1860, p.  65­82,  esp. p.  
81.  For  the  clauses  regarding  pasture  taxes,  typically  contained  in  the  'ahdnames,  see  
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extended  to  the Black Sea! Judging upon  the  everyday practice,  it  seems 
that already in the mid­sixteenth century the Polish court  tacitly regarded 
the  river Kodyma  as  the  southern  border.  Yet,  only  in  1633  this  border 
was officially recognized. 
Documents  left  from  the  embassy  of Piotr  Zborowski  reveal  the 
complexity of the international Black Sea policy  in the  second half of the 
sixteenth century. Due to  the scarcity of grain and wood in Italy, Venetian 
and  PapaI  diplomacy  developed  a  project  of  exporting  Polish  products 
through  the  Dniester  River  and  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Mediterranean. 
Typically,  the  alleged hostility of the Porte  towards any  foreign navigation 




Dniester trade would  encourage  a Turkish galley invasion  into  Poland17 . 
Officially  forbidden  to  further  this  proj ect,  Zborowski  still  anticipated 
potential gains and secretly procured anOttoman privilege for his brother, 
Krzysztof,  allowing  him  to  dispatch  wooden  products  on  his  own  ships 
down the Dniester and sell them in Ottoman provinces 18 . 
Historians  claiming  that  the  Ottomans  controlled  the  Black  Sea 
must  assume that  they were  familiar with  its  geography as we are today. 
In  the  Polish  archives  we  find  two  letters  by  Sultan  Siileyman  to  King 
Sigismund, dated  respectively in JuIy 1538  and  in  October 1540. In both 
letters, among other issues,  the sultan engages  to forbid his  subjects from 
attacking  the  royal  castles  situated  in  the  province  of Pulya  or  Polya 
｛ｾ＾ＮＱ｝Ｚ＠ Pulya  vilayetinde  alan  maik kal 'elerinize [  . .}  dahl  eylememek.  In 
the contemporary Polish court translations, preserved today aIong with the 
Turkish  originals,  the  confusing  term  Polya  is  rendered  as  polskie 
["Polish"], w polach,  ["in  the fields"] , or not rendered at  all 19 .  A modem 
17 For  the  extended  bibliography  on  this  subj ect,  see  ｋｯ łｯ､ｺｩ ･ ｪ ｣ ｺｹｫ Ｌ＠ "Imperium 
ｏｳｭ｡ń ｳｫｩ･＠ w XVI wieku  ­ kilka uwag o  potencj ale  demografi cznym i gospodarczym", 
ｐｲｺ･ｧｬą､＠ Historyczny, 78,  1987, p.  375­394, esp. p. 392. 
18  For a  copy  of the  respective  order,  dated  in  JuIy  1568  and  addressed  to  the  bey and 
kadis ofthe sandj ak of Akkerman,  see Istanbul, BOA, MD 7, p . 643, no.  1791. 
19 The document from  1538  [AGAD, AKW,  ､ ｺｩ ｡ ł＠ turecki, karton 68, teczka 59, no. 126] 
is  provided with a  sixteenth century translation, whose  author chose not  to  translate  the 
term  Pulya  but  only  mentioned  that  the  afore­mentioned  cast1es  were  located  in 
Moldavia  (w  ziemi  valaskiej),  and  with  a  seventeenth  century  translation  by  Samuel 
Otwinowski,  who  rendered  Pulya  as  "w  polach."  The  document  from  1540  [AGAD, 
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Polish  scholar,  Zygmunt  Abrahamowicz  proposed  to  derive  the  Turkish 
term  Polya  from  the  Polish  Dzikie  Pola  ["Wild  Fields"]  a  common 
contemporary  Slavic  term  for  the  steppe  frontier  lands  on  the  northem 
shore  of  the  Black  Sea20 .  This  proposal  was  also  accepted  by  two 
Romanian historians  ­ Mihail  Guboglu  and Mustafa A. Mehmed  ­ who 
studied the  aforementioned documents  as  welfl. Yet, in  the  seeond letter 
ｓｵłｴ｡ｮ＠ Stileyman names  the recipient of his order,  forbi dding any attacks · 
against  the  royal  castles,  namely  the  govemor  of  Algi"ers,  Hayreddin 
[Cezayir  beglerbegisi  Hayreddin].  A  vision  of Hayreddin  Barbarossa, 
shelling some mysterious Polish castles,  situated on  the Black Sea shore 
in  1540 almost equals  the powerful fictional  vision of Beyaz Kale created 
by Orhan Pamuk. The truth is ­ as  usually ­ more banal. Gilles Veinstein 
was  the  first  who  correctly  noticed  that  the  mysterious  Pulya  of  the 
Ottoman doeuments must refer to  Italian Puglia, or rather the Principality 
of Ban, being  the  hereditary property of King  Sigismund's wife  and  the 
queen ofPoland, Bona Sforza22 . The question remains:  were  the Ottoman 
chancery  clerks,  charged  with  issuing  these  documents,  aware  of  the 
geographic  dispersion of  the properties of  the Polish  royal  eouple23? Did 
AKW,  ､ ｺ ｩ｡ ł＠ turecki,  karton  68,  teczka  , no.  148]  is  provided  only  with Otwinowski ' s 
translation, who  for this time rendered Pulya as  "w Polszcze;" yet another translation of 
this  document  is  published  in  Bartoszewicz  (ed.),  Z  ｲęｫｯｰｩｳｭ￳ ｷ＠ Dogiela, p.  309­315; 




21 Guboglu (ed.), Catalogul, vol.  2, p. 7; Mehmed, Documente turce$ti, vol.  l,  p.31 ­34. 
22  Veinstein, "L'occupation ottomane d'Ocakov", p.  132, n.  31;  the mention of Bat"i and 
other  !ta1ian  towns  can  be  found  in  the  royal  instruction  for  Kretkowski,  who  was 
charged  to  discuss  this  issue  with Ottoman dignitaries;  see  AGAD,  Libri Legationum, 
sign.  6, fol.  36r; cf. Bidian, op"  cit., p. 314. 
23 Admittedly, Puglia and Bari can be found  in the  text and maps of the  famous Ottoman 
naval  atlas  by Piri  Reis,  composed  between  1521  and  1526.  Vet,  no  mention  is  made 
there  of the  Polish  c1aims  to  this  region,  described  as  belonging  to  the  lord  of  Spain 
(Jspanya begine tabi') Moreover, even if sixteenth century Ottoman c1erks were fluent in 
political geography,  this  hardly can be  said of their descendents  in the modern Turkish 
Republic.  In  the  prestigious  new  edition  recently  prepared  under  the  patronage  of  the 
Turkish  Prime  Ministry's  Undersecretaryship  of  Navigation,  the  Ottoman  term PuZya 
kenarlannda  is  consequently mistranslated  into  English  as  "in the Naples  Coast"  [sic] ; 




copied  the whole  expressions  contained  in  the petitions  addressed to  the 
Porte.  If the  contemporary Polish  crown  translators,  not  to  mention  the 
twentieth century scholars, did not identify Puglia, did it really matter for 
the sixteenth century Ottoman statesmen that  there might be some Polish 
cast1es  still  left  in the Black Sea and  thus  chalIenging the Ottoman c1aim 
to  its fulI  control? 
An  amusing  event  occurred  a  hundred  years  later,  in  1640,  and 
was  recorded  by  the  Polish  envoy  to  the  Porte,  Wojciech Miaskowski. 
During his  audience with  the  grand  vizier, Kara Mustafa  ｋ･ｭ｡ｮｫ･ｾＬ＠ the 
envoy was  accused  that  the  new Polish  fort  of Kudak had  been built  on 
the  Ottoman  soi l. Miaskowski  asked  for  a  map  to  refute  the  Ottoman 
c1aim.  Yet,  there was no  map  available  in  the Topkapl  Palace!  To  quote 
Miaskowski:  "in  the  absence  of a map,  I  had  to  delineate  the  border  in 
sand  with  a  singlestick,  showing  him  the  Dnieper,  Dniester,  Boh, 
Oczaków, Black Sea, Kiev, and others, as he was totalIy unaware [oftheir 
location].  OnI y  then  he  began  to  trust  me  that  Kudak  [ ... ]  had  been 
founded within His Royal Majesty's borders,,24. 
Nobody  contributed  more  towards  creating  the  myth  of  the 
Ottoman  geographic  idiocy  than  baron  de  Tott.  Reporting  the  Ottoman 





Crimean letters  addressed  to Danish kings,  preserved today in Copenhagen, 
one  finds  a  letter by Khan Mehmed  IV  Giray,  dated  in  1658  and asking 
the  king  of D enm ark ,  Frederick  III,  not  to  send  his  fleet  to  help  the 
Venetians  defend  Crete  against  the  Ottomans.  If a  Crimean  khan  was 
Piri Re 'is:  la  cartografia  turca  al/a  corte di  Solimano  ｩł＠ Magnifico  [Cavallino di Lecce,  
1987].  
24  Ｂｐｲｺｹｳｺłｯ＠ mi ､･ｬｩｮ･ｯｷ｡ć＠ mu na ziemi pa1catem, kiedy mapy nie  ｢ｹłｯ Ｌ＠ Dniepr, Dniestr,  
Boh,  Oczaków,  Czarne Morze,  Kijów  i  insze,  bo  niewiadom  ｢ｹł＠ nic.  ｄｯｰｩ･ｲｯż＠ ｰｯ｣ｺął＠  




aware  of the  oceanic  cOilllection  in  the  seventeenth century,  it  is  hard  to 
believe that Ottoman statesmen were unaware of it a century later26 . 
A sound  skepticism towards  the  "orientalist"  stereotypes,  attributing 
illiteracy  and  idiocy to  pre­modern non­W esterners  is  one  thing.  Yet,  to 
assume  that  the  early­modern  Ottoman  statesmen  led  their politics  fully 
equipped with the geopolitical notions oftoday, might be equally misleading. 
In his  recent book focusing  on Katib  Celebi  and  the  "Ottoman geographic 
mind,"  Gottfiied Hagen coins  the tenn "Salongeographie"  and  conc1udes  that 
the worlds  of scholarly science  and political praxis  rarely met.  To  quo te 
Hagen:  "die osmanischen Militars verschafften  sich  ihre Kenntnisse eher 
durch  Streifztige,  durch  Verhor  von  Gefangenen,  durch  die  Befragung 
von  im  Auftrag  der  Pforte  Reisenden  aIs  durch  die  Lekttire  von 
geographischen Werken',27. 
The  lack  of  a  precise,  delimited  border  encouraged  garrison 
commanders,  irregulars  and  ordinary  robbers  to  unlimited  raids  on  the 
neighbor's  territory,  typically  explained  as  reactions  to  the  attacks  from 
another side. Bernard Pretwicz, the commander of the Podolian fortress of 
Bar, was  so  notorious  in his raids on the Ottoman territory,  that his name 
figures  prominent1y in the correspondence between Sultan Siileyman and 
the Polish court.  Pretwicz excused himselfby explaining that he was only 
chasing  Tatar  robbers.  In fact,  he  was  wrongly  accused  of  buming 
Oczaków,  effectuated  by  another  frontier  commander  in  1545.  Yet,  the 
correspondence  between  Istanbul  and  Cracow  confirms  that  numerous 
Ottoman  merchants  were  robbed  by  the  Polish  troops  while  traveling 
between Caffa and Akkerman.  These  attacks  often happened  in the  very 
neighborhood of the Ottoman seaside forts  of Akkerman and Oczaków or 
at  the  place  [Tur.  ｭ･ｶｺż＠ ']  known  as  Hocabeg  or  Hacibey  ­ the  future 
Russian Odessa28 . 
26  Josef Matuz, Krimtatm ische  Urkunden  im  Reichsarchiv zu  Kopenhagen.  Mit historisch-
diplomatischen und spra :hlichen Untersuchungen, Freiburg,  1976, p.  128 and 131. 
27  Gottfried  Hagen,  Ein osmanischer Geograph bei der Arbeit. Enstehung und 
Gedankenwelt von Katib Ć ･ｬ ･ ｢ｩｳ＠ Gihannuma, Berlin, 2003, p.  115.  In fact  we know that 
at  least  some  Ottornan  commanders  used  maps  during  their  campaigns,  also  in  the 
Ukraine; see Abrahamowicz, "Trzy tureckie strategiczne mapy Ukrainy z XVI­XVII w." 
in  Sprawozdania z  ｰｯｳｩ･､ｺ･ń＠ komisji Polskiej Akademii Nauk. ｏ､､ｺｩ｡ł＠ w  Krakowie 
Ｈｳｴｹ｣ｺ･ńＭ｣ｺ･ｲｷｩ･｣＠ 1964), Cracow, 1964, p.  103­105. 
28  Numerous  letters  with  complains,  dated  1544­1552,  are  preserved  in  the  Polish 
archives;  for their summaries, see Abrahamowicz, Katalog dokumentów tureckich, p.  86-
88, 93-100, 109-133; for Pretwicz's apology, see Andrzej Tomczak (ed.), Ｂｍ･ｭｯｲｩ｡ł＠
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Another prominent figure who soon replaced Pretwicz as the 
Ottoman arch-enemy was Dmytro Vysneveckyj , the founder of the 
Ukrainian Sic on the Dnieper. Though he was captured and executed in 
Istanbul in 1563, by the end of the sixteenth century the Cossacks had 
become a constantphenomenon, whose activity in the Black Sea seriously 
challenged any Ottoman c1aims to its controf9. 
In 1569 ｊę ､ｲｺ･ｪ＠ Taranowski, a Polish envoy to ｓｵłｴ｡ｮ＠ Selim n, 
was invited to participate as an observer in the Ottoman-Crimean campaign 
against Muscovy. In order to join the troops besieging Astrakhan he 
traveled trom Istanbul along the Black Sea. Having crossed Dniester in 
Akkerman, he traveled two days to Oczaków along the seashore. According 
to his relation, there were no settlements in this area save for some wells 
where one could water one 's horses30. In 1578 another Polish envoy, 
Marcin Broniowski, visited the area. He also described the ruined place of 
Hacibey [Cacibiei Horodisae] . According to Broniowski, due to the 
Cossack activity the travelers were afraid not onI y to camp overnight 
there, but even to feed their horses: "idcirco ille locus viatoribus adeo 
terrori est, ut in eo non solum per noctern quiescere, verum ne pabulari 
quidem satis secure habeant,,31. 
The situation was not much better offshore. In July 1601 
Aleksander ｐｩ｡ｳ･｣ ｺ ｹńｳｫｩ Ｌ＠ the Polish envoy to the Crimea, arrived at 
Akkerman. There, he rented a Turkish galley in order to cross the sea to 
Gozleve. After the galley was loaded, somebody brought news of 
approaching Cossacks. The galley was so hastily unloaded that some of 
the envoy's wares were 10st32. Having successfully concluded his mission, 
Bernarda Pretwicza do króla z 1550 r.", Studia i ｍ｡ ｴ ･ｲｩ｡łｹ＠ do Historii ｗｯｪ ｳ ｫｯ ｷｯś｣ｩ＠ 6, 2,  
1960, p. 328-357. On this issue, see also Andrej Dziubinski, "Polsko-litewskie napady na  
tureckie pogranicze czarnomorskie w epoce dwu ostatnich Jagiellonow", Kwartalllik  
Historyczny, 103 , 1996, no. 3, p. 53-87.  
29 Veinstein, "L'occupation ottomane d'Ocakov", p. 155.  
30 "W ｂｩ｡łｯ ｧｲ ｯ､ ｺｩ ･＠ ｰｲｺ･ｷｩｯ ｺ ł･ｭ＠ ｳｩ ę＠ przez Dniestr ku Oczakowu i dwa dni m ｪ･｣ｨ｡ł＠  
polmi, wszystko nad morzem, ｷｳｺ｡ｫｯż＠ na jednem miejscu ｳ ą＠ studnie gdzie ｭｯż･＠ konia  
ｮ｡ ｰ ｯｩćＢＬ＠ see ｊ ę ､ｲｺ･ｪ＠ Taranowski, "Krótkie wypisanie drogi z Polski do Konstantynopola,  
a z ｴ｡ｭｴ ą､＠ ｺ｡ś＠ do Astrachania zamku moskiewskiego [.. .]" in: Józ{"f Ignacy Kraszewski  
(ed.), ｐｯ､ｲ￳ż･＠ i poselstwa polskie do Turcji, Cracow, 1860, p. 41-6: , esp. p. 44.  
31 Martini Broniovii [ . .} Tartariae descriptio, Cologne, 1595, p. 3. .  
32 Kazimierz ｐｵł｡ｳｫｩ＠ (ed.), "Trzy poselstwa Ł｡ｷｲｹｮ｡＠ ｐｩ｡ｳ･ ｣ｺ ｹń ｳ ｫ ｩ･ ｧｯ＠ do Kazi Gireja,  
hana Tatarów perekopskich (1601- 1603). Szkic historyczny" in: Przewodnik Nrlukowy i  
Literacki 39, (1911), p. 135- 145, 244-256, 358- 366,467-480, 553- 566, 645-660,756-
768, 845­ 864,945­ 960,esp.p. 359.  
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next year, ｐｩ｡ｳ ･｣ｺｹ ń ｳ ｫｩ＠ was again sent to the khan. In May 1602 he 
witnessed another wave of panie in Akkennan, caused by a Cossack 
foral3. 
Though often presenting themselves as Christian warriors, the 
Cossacks did not make much difference between their victims - be they 
Turks, Greeks, Armenians, or Slavs. An Armenian priest from Caffa named 
Xacatur, who left his memoirs covering the first half of the seventeenth 
century, presented the Cossacks as godless bandits, who murdered Christians, 
plundered churches, and kidnapped women. After one such Cossack incursion 
to the Crimea Xacatur recalled that "Armenians and Turks mourned and cried 
to gether,,34. 
In his in-depth studies, Victor Ostapchuk has demonstrated the 
psychological effects of Cossack raids on the Ottoman subjects inhabiting 
the Black Sea region in the seventeenth century35. In the Ottoman political 
language, this region already belonged to the Domain of Islam [Darii '1-
Islam], contrary to the Western Mediterranean, descóbed as the Domain 
of the Holy War [Darii'I-CihadJ and still to be conquered36 . Yet, the 
Ottomans themselves, when referring to fighting the Cossacks on the 
Black Sea, typically used the tenn gaza, thus confinning the fact that 
"infidels" were still in good standing in this region. In the 1620s the 
English envoy Thomas Roe made several references to the absence of the 
Ottoman fleet from the Mediterranean since it had to be used in the Black 
Sea37 . The most lapidary comment was made in 1676 by the Venetian 
33 Ibid., p. 65 1-652, 655 .  
34 Edmond Schiitz (ed.), "Eule armenische Chronik von Kaffa aus der ersten Htilfte des  
17. Jahrhunderts", Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 29, 1975, p. 133-
186, esp. p. 149. 
35 Victor Ostapchuk,  "The human landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the  face of the 
Cossack naval raids", Oriente Moderno 20 (81), n.  S., 2001, (The Ottomans and the Sea), 
edited by K.  ｆｌ ｾ ･ｴ Ｌ＠ p. 23­95 , esp. p.  94; see aIs o Ostapchuk,  "An Ottoman Gaziiniime on 
HaIn  Pasa' s  naval  campaign against  the  Cossacks  (1621)", Harvard Ukrainian Studies 
14, 1990,  (Adeiphotes: a Tribute to Omeljan Pritsak by his students), p.  482­521. 
36  For  instance,  in  the  sultan 's  intitulation  from  the  Ottoman  'ahdname given  to  the 
Polish  king,  dated  1577,  AIgiers  was  still  described  as  the  Dornain  of the  Holy War 
(daru 'l-cihad) even  though  it  had  be en  conquered  over  50  years  earlier.  The  same 
expression,  evcn  emiched  as  darli 'l-cihad ve 'l-harb, was  repeated  in  the  Ottoman 
documents  from  1591 ,  1597, 1598, 1607,1623, 1640, and  1667 (daru'l-cihad only);  see 
ｋｯłｯ､ｺｩ･ｪ｣ｺｹｫ Ｌ＠ Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Re/ations, p.  270,  285,  303,  314,  330,  389, 
403,459,477. 
37  0 stapchuk,  "The human landscape", p . 88­89. 
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bailo, Giacomo Quirini : "da ｾｵ･ｳｴｯ＠ mar Nero dipende la difesa e la 
conservazione deI mar Bianco,,3 . 
Ostapchuk mockingly treats the "chimera of Ottoman lake" as 
supposedly lasting for 300 years. According to this author, seventeenth 
century Ottoman statesmen and chronic1ers "tried to avoid admitting that 
the sea's former 'pristine' state no longer existed," thus leading modem 
historians "to uncritically and unwittingly accept and perpetuate the 
notion of the Ottomans having three centuries of undifferentiated control 
and security in the Black Sea,,39. These arguments were so powerful that 
they convinced Charles King - the author of a recent history of the Black 
Sea - to move the chronology, once proposed by Cemovodeanu, a 
hundred years ahead. According to King, it was not the treaty of Kti9tik 
Kaynarca, not even the Russian conquest of Azov, the appearance of 
French consuls in the Crimea, or granting the right of navigation to the 
Dutch already in 1680, but the Cossack activity in the early seventeenth 
century that terminated the "Ottoman lake,,4o. 
Ostapchuk and King questioned the longevity of "Ottoman lake," 
but not the concept itself. To quote a recent artic1e by Ostapchuk: "In his 
works Halil Ina1clk has demonstrated the significance of control of the 
Black Sea for the strength and well-being of the Ottoman Empire. [ ...J 
Establishment of control of the Black Sea basin, though relatively easily 
accomplished, was an achievement not to be underestimated,,41. 
Perhaps one should go a step further. To remind the thesis of 
Ina1clk, onI y with the conquest ofBudjak in 1538 did the Ottomans fulfill 
their dream of controlling the Black Sea. Less than a century later, in 
1637 the Don Cossacks captured the Ottoman fortress of Azak (Azov), 
badly humiliating the prestige of the padishah. Thus, at 1east between 
38 Nicolo Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet (eds.), Le Relazioni degli stali Europei lette al  
senato dagli ambasciatori Veneziani nel secolo decimosettimo, series 5: Turchia, pt. 2,  
Venice, 1872, p. 168; see also ｋｯłｯ､ｺｩ･ｪ｣ｺｹｫ Ｌ＠ "The Ottoman northem policy as seen  
from the Venetian archives" in T. Baykara (ed.), CIEPO Osmanh Oncesi ve Osmanh  
ａｲ｡ｾｴｬｲｭ｡ｬ｡ｲｺ＠ Uluslararasl Komitesi XIV Sempozyumu Bildirileri, 18-22 EylUl 2000,  
ｃ［･ｾｭ･Ｌ＠ Ankara, 2004, p. 417-426.  
39 Ostapchuk, "The human landscape", p. 89 and 93.  
40 Charles King, Black Sea: A History (Oxford, 2004), p. 132-13·t; cf. Cernovodeanu,  
"England and the question offree trade in the Black Sea", p. 19-22.  
41 Ostapchuk, "The Ottornan Black Sea Steppe Frontier and the Struggle for a New Order  
in Eastem Europe, 1648-1681", Turkish Studies Association Journal [forthcorrril1g]; I would  
like to thank the author for letting me quote his artic1e before p'ublication.  
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1538 and 1637 one should expect a relative peace. Yet, at the beginning 
of this period, the Ottoman northem Black Sea border was still uncertain 
and in 1545 Oczaków was reduced to ashes by Polish and Lithuanian 
troops. The following decades brought several Polish interventions in 
Moldavia, the rise of Michael the Brave in Wallachia, and rising Cossack 
activity. 
Apart trom the mouth of the Dnieper, there was another section of 
the Black Sea shore where the Ottoman control was never complete. Two 
interesting documents are preserved in the Spanish archive of Simancas. 
The first one is the letter of the Georgian king of Kartli, Simeon I, 
addressed to King Philip II of Spain and issued in Tiflis in August 1596. 
The letter is preserved in two sealed copies - one in Armenian and one in 
Greek, and provided with contemporary Spanish translations. The king of 
Georgia proposed Phi lip II a common military action against the Turk, 
expecting that the proposed coalition would also be joined by Alexander, 
the Georgian king ofKakheti, Zsigmunt Bathory, the prince ofTransylvania, 
and Shah Abbas of Persia. One must admit that the moment was auspicious: 
it coincided with the long Habsburg-Ottoman war and the crisis of 
Ottoman authority in the Danubian principalities. The second letter, 
preserved in Simancas, was issued in Georgian in 1625 by King Teimuraz 
I of Kakheti. It also contained a proposal of a league, addressed to King 
Phi lip IV and formulated in a most megalomaniac form. The letter was 
brought by a monk who presented his patron as "el Rey de la Iberia, que 
por otro nombre se llama Rey de los Jorgianos; el qual tiene sus Reynos y 
estados entre Persianos y Turcos, que se tienden desde el mar Caspio 
hasta el mar Negro cerca deI monte Caucaso,,42. Interestingly, two years 
later, in his famous memorial addressed to the pope, Pietro della Valle 
proposed to use the Cossack Black Sea f1eet in order to ｫ･･ｾ＠ communication 
with Georgia while preparing an anti-Ottoman crusade4 . Like so many 
others, these exotic projects never materialized. Yet, they reflected the 
state ofmind of some prominent inhabitants of the region. 
42 Luis Gil and Jose Manuel Floristan, "Cartas de los reyes georgianos Simeón I de Kartli 
a Felipe II y Teimuraz I de Kakheti a Felipe IV", Estudios Clasicos, 89, 1985, p. 307-
345, esp. p. 332. 
43 See David Kolbaia, "Informacja o ｇｾｩＬ przygotowana w 1627 roku dla Jego Śｷｩąｴｯ｢ｬｩｷｯś｣ｩ＠
Urbana VIII przez Piotra delia Valle, pielgrzyma", Pro GeOlogia. Journal oj Kartvelological 
Studies, 12,2005, p. 129-151, esp. p. 151. 
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To be sure, for over 300 years the Ottomans controlled the large 
part of human activity in the Black Sea. Yet, this image should not be 
taken as too static since the control of any early modem state over its 
subjects and naturai resources had obvious limits. If the comparison with 
the harem is to be taken seriously, a historian must admit that the sultan's 
control ofhis womenfolk was not complete either. 
In the last decade, many an Ottoman historian has consciously ar 
unconsciously moved away from the centralistic and statist vi ew one e 
proposed by Halil Ina1clk. Amy Singer exploited the potential of 
negotiation, available even to most humble Ottoman peasants44. lane 
Hathaway explored ancient tribal connections and their bearing on the 
political life of Ottoman Egypt45. According to Gabor Agoston, "in 
discussing the 'classical age' students often become victims of their 
sources. If one looks at the sultanic decrees sent from Istanbul to the 
provinces during the mid-sixteenth century, the impression gained is one 
of an Ottoman central govemment whose will prevailed even in the most 
remote frontier areas,,46. One should add that in the Turkish historiography 
this "centralist" and "Weberian" bias was further strengthened by the 
intellectual climate ofthe early Kemalist Republic. 
Admittedly, the centralized model has also its believers, to 
mention only Murad (:lzakc;a or ｾ･ｶｫ･ｴ＠ Pamuk. Yet, (:lzakc;a labels the 
Ottoman centrali sm as "proto-pseudo-socialism" and blames it for the 
ultimate stagnancy and collapse of the Empire47. Pamuk, in his recent 
Monetary History oj the OUoman Empire admits the highly centralistic 
character of Ottoman state under Mehmed II. However, he also wams that 
this example should not be treated as typical. To quote Pamuk: "in fact, 
the reign of Mehmed II was unique in the way the central government 
intervened to regulate not only specie and ｭｯｮ ęｹ＠ but also trade and the 
urban economy,,48. According to Pamuk, in the sixteenth century Ottoman 
44 Amy Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Offieials. Rural Administration  
around Sixteenth eentwy Jerusalem, Cambridge, 1994.  
45 Jane Hathaway, A Tale oj Two Factiofls. Myth, Memory, and Jdentity in Ottoman  
Eg;pt and Yemen, Albany, 2003.  
46 Gabor A.goston, "A Flexible Empire: Authority and its Lirnits on the Ottoman  
Frontiers" in Kernal H. Karpat with Robert W. Zens (eds.), Ottoman Borderlands. , 
Issues, Personalities and Politieal Changes, Madison, 2003, p. 15-32, esp. p. 15. 
47 Murat <;lzak.ya, A Comparative Evolution ojBusiness Partnerships. The Islamie World 
and Europe, with Speeijie Rejerenee to the Ottoman Archives, Leiden, 1996, p. 210. 
48 ｾ･ｶｫ･ｴ＠ Pamuk, A Monetary History ojthe Ottoman Empire, Cambridge, 2004, p. 45. 
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society the state control and regulative mechanisms were already much 
weaker. 
Certainly, there is still much to leam about the Ottoman control of 
the Black Sea. Moreover, I am deeply convinced that our future 
understanding and evaluation of this control will be closely related to our 
general perception of the functioning, of the Ottoman Empire and the 
effectiveness of its state bureaucracy in the "classical" and "post-
classical" age. 
